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Abstract There might not be a specific nano-ethics,
but there definitely is an ethics of new & emerging
science and technology (NEST), with characteristic
tropes and patterns of moral argumentation. Ethical
discussion in and around nanoscience and technology
reflects such NEST-ethics. We offer an inventory of
the arguments, and show patterns in their evolution, in
arenas full of proponents and opponents. We also
show that there are some nano-specific issues: in how
size matters, and when agency is delegated to smart
devices. Our overall approach is a pragmatist ethics,
and we conclude that struggle (and learning) might be
more productive than models emphasizing consensus.
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Introduction
Can there be a dedicated nano-ethics, just as there is,
by now, a bio-ethics? And should there be? The title
of the journal Nanoethics is careful in that it creates
some distance to nanotechnology in its sub-title:
Ethics of technologies that converge at the nano-
scale. While there are an increasing number of articles
and comments that call for nano-ethics these are
mostly calls for more ethical reflection in general, or
focus on the utopian and doomsday scenarios that
have been put forward (e.g. [17, 27, 31]). There is
little specific to nanotechnology that would warrant
the prefix ‘nano’ [19]. This is different from the case
of bio-ethics, where aspects and issues derived from
living creatures are a shared starting point. Nanotech-
nology has no such common referent other than that
phenomena and manipulations occur at the nano-
scale. It is an umbrella term covering a host of
heterogeneous technologies, from electronics to mate-
rials and on to medical use of nanoparticles. At the
same time, there are calls for nano-ethics, and
working on nano-ethics is a business proposition for
organisations like the Centre for Responsible Nano-
technology (http://CRNano.org) and The Nanoethics
Group (http://www.nanoethics.org).
More important for our query about the status of
nano-ethics is the fact that nanotechnologies are
enabling technologies. By making existing technolo-
gies smaller and faster, well-known ethical issues, say
privacy and new ICT, or point-of-care diagnostics and
professional-medical responsibilities, can become
more pressing, but not necessarily different in kind.
Quite a number of reports reflect this by taking sector
issues (medical, environment, military) or moral
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principles (equity, privacy, safety, sustainability, se-
curity) as their starting point, rather than specific
features of nanotechnology. (For a good example,
see [50].)
Still, there are calls for nano-ethics. And actors
present issues about nanotechnology as ethical issues.
A striking example (which we will use again later on)
is this quote from Philip J. Bond, US Under-Secretary
of Commerce, ‘Responsible nanotechnology devel-
opment,’ in the SwissRe workshop of Dec 2004
([49], p. 7):
Given nanotechnology’s extraordinary economic
and societal potential, it would be unethical, in
my view, to attempt to halt scientific and
technological progress in nanotechnology. Nano-
technology offers the potential for improving
people’s standard of living, healthcare, and
nutrition; reducing or even eliminating pollution
through clean production technologies; repairing
existing environmental damage; feeding the
world’s hungry; enabling the blind to see and
the deaf to hear; eradicating diseases and offering
protection against harmful bacteria and viruses;
and even extending the length and the quality of
life through the repair or replacement of failing
organs. Given this fantastic potential, how can our
attempt to harness nanotechnology’s power at the
earliest opportunity – to alleviate so many earthly
ills – be anything other than ethical? Conversely,
how can a choice to halt be anything other than
unethical?
In this quote one sees how actors tend to use the
qualifiers ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ to indicate what is
good (must be done) and bad (must not be done). The
key feature for our discussion, however, is that it
makes a general point about progress thanks to new
technology, rather than saying anything specific about
nanotechnology other than that it is wonderful and
will enable the blind to see and the deaf to hear
(phrases with a biblical ring to them). Clearly, there
are ethics involved, but these are not nano-ethics, but
ethics of progress and/or negative impact through
new technology.
Similarly, the recent exercises in public engage-
ment with nanotechnology and its promises and
possible concerns, like focus groups and a citizen
jury in the UK, or nano-dialogue projects funded by
the European Union, tend to come up with reports
which are quite general and could apply to any new or
emerging technology. This has led to critical com-
ments, by nanotechnology actors as well as analysts:
why do these exercises at all if nothing specific to
nanotechnology comes out of the discussions and
reflections?
What we will do in this article is to turn this
criticism around, and see it as a finding, and starting
point for further analysis. There appear to be certain
patterns of moral argumentation about new and
emerging technology, which are then applied to
nanotechnology. In other words, while there may not
be a nano-ethics, there definitely is a NEST-ethics.
The prefix NEST stands for New and Emerging
Science and Technology (similar to the title of the
EU funding program NEST in the 6th Framework
Program). Our contention is that most ethical ques-
tions presently raised about nanotechnology belong to
NEST-ethics. In the next two sections we will show
that there are indeed typical argumentative patterns
that together constitute a NEST-ethics. Such a NEST-
ethics is not given once and for all. It evolves with
further experiences with new science and technology,
like stem cells and now also promises and concerns
about nanotechnology. But there are also strong
continuities.
NEST-ethics typically exists as a set of recurring
tropes and argumentative patterns. By ‘trope’ we
understand a recurring motif or argument that is
supposed to have particular force. By argumentative
‘pattern’ we understand two or more ethical argu-
ments that hang together in the sense that they
provoke each other into existence. The tropes and
the ‘storylines’ in the argumentative patterns have
become a repertoire that is available in late-modern
societies, both as a framing of how actors view issues
and expect others to view them, and as a kind of
toolkit that can be drawn upon in concrete debates.
The to-and-fro of moral argumentation about
NEST is actually played out at two levels. There are
what one might call meta-ethical issues, addressing
the relation between technology and morality, with a
particular focus on the ‘new and emerging’ feature.
We will discuss these issues first. The remaining
tropes and patterns in the repertoire can subsequently
be clustered according to the dominant moral standard
referred to implicitly or explicitly: collective utility
(utilitarianism, consequentialism more broadly),
duties and rights (deontology), the just distribution
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of costs and benefits (theories of justice), or con-
ceptions of the good life (virtue ethics, or as we prefer
to say: good life ethics – which merges into ‘good
society’ ethics).
This turns out to be more than making an
inventory. Most often, there is a pattern: the debate
starts with seemingly obvious consequentialist argu-
ments. These are then criticized, and this provokes
reference to equity, basic values and aspects of the
good life. In response, there are attempts to blackbox
these references, and return to consequentialist argu-
ments which are easier to handle discussion and
management (in a broad sense) of new technology in
society. And this allows a simple division of moral
labour where scientists and other introductors of new
and emerging science and technology are justified in
pushing on as long as they are willing to consider
side-effects.
After we articulate the outline of a NEST-ethics,
we can go back to nanotechnology and ask whether
there might be processes and patterns specific to
nanotechnology – and thus lead to the articulation of a
nano-ethics. For example, we will look at an
ambivalence inherent to nanotechnology: many new
and interesting phenomena and effects occur at the
nano-scale, so “size matters.” But this claim also
applies to risky properties and effects, like the
increased reactivity and mobility across biological
partitions, up to the blood–brain barrier. Regulators
are struggling with this problem, because existing
regulatory approaches cannot accommodate the as-
pect of size (of particles).
We conclude with a short reflection on the
implications of such ambivalencies for nano-ethical
debates as well as NEST-ethical debates generally. In
particular, we identify the inadequacy of agora-types
of debates, and argue that an arena model is more
suitable. Thus, nano-ethics becomes an occasion to
address such issues, and develop NEST-ethics further.
Technology, Morality and Ethics: Preliminary
Reflections
New and emerging science and technology constitute
novelties, already within the world of science and
technology. Of course, some novelties are more novel
than others. A distinction is often made between
incremental and radical (or disruptive) innovation.
But they are still innovations, and some existing
alignments will be threatened, or at least opened up.
Then, a process of re-alignment starts which runs
more or less smoothly. In science and technology, the
creation of novelty is actively pursued, and the new
findings and options and proofs of principle are
expected to be taken up. There is also resistance to
change, however, as the history of science and
technology amply shows.
Responses of society to new and emerging science
and technology and its societal embedding also vary.
One can hypothesize that when a new technology can
be fitted to existing artifacts, routines and strategies,
and/or when it appears to address existing or newly
articulated needs and desires (when new experiences
are offered as with Sony’s Walkman, cf. Du Gay et al.
[12]), its embedding will go smoothly. There are also
general cultural patterns in the response to novelty. It
can be seen as the hero who shall conquer, overcome
the barriers of the existing order which will soon
become obsolete; or the deviant, the wayward, and if
it persists, it becomes the sinner that must be punished
for going against the existing order. The moral flavour
of the terms is not accidental.
The link with moral argumentation and ethics
requires some reconsideration of ethics as well. We
will build on philosophical pragmatism, especially in
Dewey’s version [10, 22, 23]. In the pragmatics of
everyday life, morals exist mainly as routines which
are considered to be self-evident so that people are
hardly aware of their existence. These moral routines
once started their existence as conscious solutions for
conflicting stakeholder interests/rights or as answers
to the question: what would be a good life to lead, as
an individual and/or as a community? But afterwards,
we unthinkingly obey these tacit norms and unthink-
ingly pursue these tacit values. For example, as
Williams [55] pointed out, ‘normal’ people do not
consciously decide that it is immoral to kill an
obnoxious colleague. The thought should not even
cross their minds. And if it does, this indicates
abnormality.
We become aware of moral routines when people
disobey them, when conflicts between routines
emerge and a moral dilemma arises, or when they
are no longer able to provide satisfactory responses to
new problems. To put it strongly: Whereas morality
is characterized by unproblematic acceptance, ethics
is marked by explicitness and controversy. Ethics is
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‘hot’ morality; morality is ‘cold’ ethics. We perform
ethics when we put up moral routines for discussion.
For example: in discussions about emerging technol-
ogies, values like health, safety, sustainability and
economic growth are usually ‘cold’; the use of
embryonic stem cells or the possibility of human
enhancement are ‘hot.’
Emerging technologies, and the accompanying
promises and concerns, can rob moral routines of
their self-evident invisibility and turn them into topics
for discussion, deliberation, modification, reassertion.
This is also an effect of promoters of a new
technology who stress its novelty to attract the
attention of parties who are needed for their financial,
political or moral support. Nanotechnology is not just
about new phenomena at the nano-scale and their
manipulation, it is about new possibilities for diagno-
sis and drug delivery, about a third industrial
revolution, about human enhancement, up to a heaven
on earth where the blind will see and the deaf will
hear (as in Under-Secretary Bond’s quote).
Working with a novelty necessarily means ventur-
ing into the unknown. The extent of the unknown
may be large, as in the case of genetic manipulation,
or small as when an improved ingredient to toothpaste
is advertised as “New! Better!” A principle problem is
that it is never known what the extent of the unknown
is. We may think that the new ingredient of toothpaste
is harmless, but it might turn out to create a new
allergy (as has happened occasionally; tests can only
test for known allergies). Thus, NEST-ethics will have
to address two issues at the same time: there is
ignorance about what the new technology might
become and do, and moral routines cannot be relied
upon unquestioningly. The newly emerging technol-
ogy robs morals of their self-evident invisibility, and
transforms them into ethics.
The friction between established moral routines
and new technology is a well-known issue, with the
advent of the contraceptive pill as a canonical
example (and one where behaviours changed and
morality adapted). And instead of friction, the new
possibilities may open up spaces for reflection. A
small but interesting example from micro-technology
to be further enabled by nano-miniaturization is the
Verichip™: a passive RFID chip with a person’s
identification that is implanted under the skin, and is
used (on a voluntary basis) by regular visitors to
nightclubs in Barcelona and Rotterdam. They don’t
need to carry an identity card anymore, and if the chip
includes a money deposit, they can also pay with it,
and don’t need to carry a wallet. Just come as
themselves – with their identity enhanced by the
implanted chip. Many more options are possible for
nightclub visitors, and the company also pushes other
uses. The ethical question here is what sort of identity
we want to construct (with the active support of the
company) for ourselves. A new good life is being
articulated stimulated by technical ability to construct
a variety of such lives.
Our use of morality as ‘cold’ and ethics as ‘hot’
helps us to highlight an important phenomenon. And
it is this phenomenon of opening up of existing moral
routines and moral orders which is important, not our
specific use of the terms – even if this helps us to
make our point, and write this article. Terminology is
difficult anyway, because actors use the label ‘ethics,’
and particularly ‘ethical’, to refer to what is good to
do, and should be done (or refrained from doing),
rather than the reflexive discussion about what might
be good to do that we would highlight.
We acknowledge that our conception of ‘ethics’
takes us some distance from how actors use this label.
But this is necessary for understanding what hap-
pens.1 In NEST-debates ‘ethics’ is often positioned as
a brake on technology (like technology assessment
used to be labelled as technology ‘harassment’). But
positions promoting technology are every inch as
ethical as positions harassing or limiting technology
in the name of some higher value. This implies that
Under-Secretary Bond’s simple contrast of ethical and
unethical cannot be kept up. Instead, ‘ethical’ is the
articulation (including contestation) of what used to
be morally self-evident.
Our approach to ethics is also broader compared
with how ethical arguments in NEST-discussions are
contrasted with economic, environmental, social,
political, medical, or metaphysical arguments. The
use of the acronym ELSA for Ethical, Legal and
Social Aspects, introducing three different aspects, is
a case in point. We argue that there is no principle
difference. Presumably ‘non-ethical’ arguments in the
end refer to stakeholders’ interests/rights and/or
conceptions of the good life – thus, ethics. For
example, economic arguments in favour of, or
1We expect our definition to also allow us to stimulate
reflection when interacting with actors in the nano-world.
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opposed to, an emerging technology usually follow a
clearly utilitarian logic, with a focus on maximising
collective happiness. Or metaphysical considerations
on human–machine interactions refer to ethical con-
ceptions of what constitutes a good life for humans.
For health and environmental risk issues, this point
is particularly important, because these are often
treated as technical questions. As has been shown in
detail for recombinant DNA, genetic modification,
and telecommunication standards [37, 42, 53], the
focus on technical questions is only possible when
some closure of the open-ended ethical (or normative,
or political, or foundational) debate has occurred, and
further discussion can be delegated to technical–
analytical work. Conversely, the technical discussion
can be opened up again to ethical discussion when the
assumptions protecting the technical approach are
questioned.
The evolution of the debate on health and
environmental risks of nano-particles can be under-
stood in these terms. In the late 1990s, there were
some early warnings, based on very limited evidence
and on the analogy with risks of asbestos. When
precautionary approaches were advocated, and partic-
ularly when (in 2003) the ETC group proposed a
moratorium on nano-particle production [13], the
debate became acrimonious, and the right of ETC
and other critics to raise their voice was contested.
Explicit and implicit normative questions about the
sort of life we should lead: avoiding risks, or
experimenting and learning, or even embracing risks,
were at issue. The closure of this debate can be located
in time, linked to the wide acceptance of reinsurance
company SwissRe’s report Nanotechnology: Small
Matter, Many Unknowns [48]. Risks of nano-particles
became a legitimate question: further research was
pushed (and funded), and government agencies started
to investigate ways to regulate such risks. Thus, it was
uncertainty about the extent of such risks that was at
issue, rather than ignorance about the nature of
potential hazards. By now, some actors, concerned
nano-scientists as well as NGOs like Greenpeace UK,
realize that this focus on handling the risks technically
and in terms of new regulation, is backgrounding
wider considerations about the desirability of devel-
oping and using nano-particles.
We see a pattern here. In addition, the recourse to
the technical is itself a normative position, and thus a
meta-ethical issue.
NEST Ethics: Meta-ethical Issues
NEST-ethics starts with the opening up an existing
order by a scientific or technological novelty that
undermines the self-evidence of existing moral rou-
tines, in combination with the additional challenge of
our ignorance about the nature and effects of this
novelty. We can then identify and characterize
patterns of moral argumentation as they occur (and
with examples from nanotechnology). Interestingly,
part of the argumentation is at a meta-level: about our
background understanding of the issues and how to
approach them, rather than about substantial questions
about good action and the good life. This is linked to
the “new and emerging” aspect of NEST, where it is
too early to reach conclusions about concrete ethical
issues, but the prospect of having to do so induces
discussion of how to go about it – which raises meta-
ethical questions.
The first meta-ethical issue derives from the prima
facie presupposition of NEST-ethics that one can
influence the development of new technology, and so
has to discuss desirability as well as feasibility. This
leads into a long-standing discussion about techno-
logical determinism, and its more recent counterpoint,
social determination, or at least social construction, of
technological development. In the technological de-
terminist view, emerging technologies will materialize
anyhow, independent of what people think, deliberate
or decide. The problem of how to act under
conditions of ignorance is thus ‘solved’ by denying
human agency. Technological determinism might be
justified by appealing to a transcendent technological
reason, unfolding/materializing itself like a Hegelian
idea. Actually, transcendent reason tends to be
replaced by immanent strategic games, an equally
unyielding, superhuman international competition: if
we don’t do it, our competitors will, so the new
technology will happen anyway. Human agency is not
completely denied, but delegated to the strategic
games that actors continue to play, and depend on.
The self-fulfilling prophecy of Moore’s Law for
semiconductors is a clear example. Conversely, those
who are not part of the strategic games experience
another lack of agency, that of outsiders. In recent
focus groups and other public engagement exercises
on nanotechnology, particularly in Britain, members
of the public voiced their experience of not having
any agency, and were then joined, to the surprise of
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both parties, by nano-scientists being involved but
unable to make a difference either.2
More central actors, like firms developing new
technological options, and government agencies en-
abling new technology development and constraining
it through regulation, might be seen as carriers of
agency. Even then, there is the fact of non-malleabil-
ity of technological developments, not because of
inherent technological determinism but because direc-
tions and path dependencies emerge at the collective
level, in a sense behind the back of the actors. The
emergence of paradigms and dominant designs are
examples. As one of us (AR) has argued, such non-
malleability is itself a societal construction, but once
in place, it cannot be easily undermined. Human
agency, so dear to classical ethics, has to be replaced
by distributed and collective agency, and a time
dimension has to be introduced. Human agency can
make some difference at an early stage (even if the
issues and directions are still unclear), but much less
so at a later stage, when alignments have sedimented.3
Actual moral argumentation patterns are divided,
depending on the situation and audience. When
addressing external audiences, promotors of new
technology use the deterministic metaphor of a train
that cannot be stopped so as to enrol funders and
publics.4 These are then painted as fatalistic, and
experience themselves that way. Internally, however,
the determinism is leavened by the possibility to do
better. Illustrative is Vicki Colvin’s testimony before
US Congress, April 2003, on the “wow-yuck pattern”
of public appreciation of new and emerging science
and technology. She presents this pattern as a
recurrent phenomenon, but then adds that we can
counteract it if “we” understand what “we” (the
promotors of NEST) did wrong. So nanotechnology
actors need not repeat the mistakes made by biotech-
nology actors. Thus, determinism is repositioned as a
contingent result of actors’ behaviours and interac-
tions leading to unintended outcomes at the collective
level. Understanding of such processes then enables
agency, in the sense of making a bit of difference
rather than forcing one’s way.
An interesting further aspect is the subterraneous
link between how the promotors (or enactors, or
insiders) position new technology, and how outsiders,
publics, critics do so. Enactors position the technol-
ogy as promising as such, independently of the efforts
that actors must make. They let the promising
technology speak for them, and so give it agency.
Critics and publics see technology as exogenous,
entering society from somewhere outside. For the
critics, Franklin ([16], p. 87) notes: “This view [of
Fukuyama and Habermas] of genetic manipulation as
a force unto itself, hostile to social order and
integration (…). Here ‘biotechnology’ is attributed a
sinister agency (…).” For the public, a similar
response was visible in the reports of a focus group,
and their discussion of new technologies, including
nanotechnology, and their perceived ability to trans-
form society and nature. One participant says: “It’ll
get out of the cage I’m sure” – so it is a wild beast
that has to be contained … (Kearnes et al. [21], p. 53)
Thus, ‘outsiders’ also picture new technology as an
independent force. In other words, there is an unholy
alliance with the insiders, and this perpetuates the
myth of exogenous technology.
There are other patterns of second-order moral
argumentation. One such pattern derives from the
dual way that past experiences can be drawn upon.
The past is mobilized to give credibility to arguments
favouring promoting NEST but also to arguments
pleading for prudence and precaution.
There are general arguments in favour: the new
technology will bring us all kinds of good, because
technologies have done so in the past; mankind has
progressed because our forbears did not shrink away
from their duties. Prometheus is invoked here (and
sometimes there are second thoughts about such
progress being a Faustian bargain – by now, the two
tropes are often linked). It does not matter that first
only technological ‘haves’ profit, because eventually
the benefits will trickle down to the lower strata. Even
the poorest person is nowadays materially better off
than kings were in the Middle Ages.
2At the launch, London, 6 April 2006, of the results of the
Lancaster/DEMOS project on upstream public engagement
with nanotechnology, this was apparent in the video of the
discussions during the final meeting of participants (available at
www.demos.ac.uk).
3In innovation studies and constructive technology assessment
studies, this has been analysed in terms of a knowledge-control
dilemma [7], modulation of certain phases of innovation
journeys [38], and ‘midstream modulation’ [15], between
upstream open-ended activities, and downstream concrete
implementation.
4When using the metaphor, the promotors conveniently forget
that a train requires railway tracks which have been laid out
before by human hands.
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And then there are arguments cautioning against
the emerging technology: technologies always have
unintended, and quite often unwanted, side-effects;
there are always bad people misusing technology;
new technology makes the rich richer and the poor
often more powerless; scientists and technologists are
always promising more than they can make come
true; and so on.
The trope that humans (some humans) end up
misusing new technologies for destructive purposes
can be called the inverse King Midas trope: whereas
the mythical Greek king turned everything he touched
into gold, modern (Western) civilisation turns every-
thing into a means of destruction (and both Midas and
civilisation got into trouble). This bleak view of
mankind can lead to the conclusion that we should
not go for more and more ‘technological toys.’ The
ethics are more complex, however, as is clear in the
debate about guns (in the USA): do guns kill people
(so no more guns), or do people kill people (so people
must do better)?
We have used a simple dichotomy between
promotion and caution here, but there is more at play
than contentions between proponents and opponents.
There is a sequence of actions and interactions, which
creates a specific pattern of moral argumentation [46].
First, there is recognition and announcement of a
novel technological option and its promise. In
response, those pleading for prudence and precaution
stress the novelty of the new technology as well, but
now to communicate the message that there is not just
uncertainty, but ignorance about effects of the new
technology. The promotors now face a quandary.
They had started the (NEST-ethical) discussion by
stressing the novelty of the emerging technology, so
as to attract attention and enroll allies. This move then
creates opposition that cannot simply be negated. One
strategy that is used often is to play down the novelty
of the NEST, presenting it as nothing unusual. What
was first introduced as a ‘revolution’ is now toned
down to ‘business as usual.’ In the case of nanotech-
nology, the slogan then is: we’re just making things
smaller and faster. Or in the discussion about health
and environmental risks of nanoparticles: we’ve had
nano-sized particles around all the time, in soot from
fires and in exhausts of diesel engines.
The message thus shifts: the new technology is in
fact not new at all, the past contains all kinds of
precedents for the emerging technology. Haven’t we
been genetically modifying animals since the first
breeding experiments? Are twins not living proofs
that clones are willed by God and/or in accordance
with natural order? Is education not a basic form of
human enhancement already? Is writing itself not a
technology that produced texts, an external medium
to which we delegate part of our cognitive power and
autonomy, no different from when we will interface
our brains with computers? If we see these earlier
technologies as being in accordance with our pres-
ent moral intuitions, we should now be consistent
and see the new technologies as similarly acceptable.
This is not only an argument from precedent: the
new technology is nothing new; but also an injunc-
tion to stay with the moral intuitions that have
evolved in our interaction with earlier technological
developments.
This last point creates an opening for technology
critics to turn the argument from precedent around,
creating an argument from consequent. Instead of
legitimizing future developments in terms of criteria
of the past and present, they de-legitimize the past and
present by applying criteria derived from a desirable
future. For example, if possible cloning of farm
animals is seen as an unacceptable form of commod-
ification of living organisms, the concern about
commodification should be used as well to reconsider
our current acceptance of the bio industry. And if we
are really worried about toxicity of nano tubes, should
we not be consistent and worry about all the fine dust
currently produced by exhaust fumes as well?
There can be further rebuttals; the pattern contin-
ues. The steps in this pattern have become expected in
our late-modern risk society, as it were as moves in a
game. In that way, the pattern will create the positions
of proponent and opponent: an inquiry into possible
side-effects will be treated as an indication of
opposition to the new technology, and thus call up
further arguments legitimating the original inquiry –
turning the innocent inquirer into an actual opponent.
The third main pattern of meta-ethical argumenta-
tion is linked to a basic characteristic of NEST-ethics,
viz. the possibility that emerging technologies may
change our morals and ethical considerations. This
gives rise to two mirroring arguments. Technological-
ly induced moral change can be projected as almost
inevitable – the habituation argument – or depicted as
a threat – moral corruption. The pattern of argumen-
tation is now about the general relation between
Nanoethics (2007) 1:3–20 9
morals and technology. Such arguments do not aim to
win the match by gaining the most points, but by
revaluing the whole match. As a strategy, such a
revaluation occurs late in the game, when first-round
arguments seem unable to win the day.
The first argument is the habituation argument. Its
basic tenet is that although at present the new
technology is in conflict with established morals,
there will be reconsideration of the morals when
people become used to the new technology and its
possibilities and limitations. In time morality will
adapt. Precedents are quoted, ranging from overcom-
ing fright (as for the first trains, which might even
frighten the cows in the meadow so that their milk
would turn sour) to more explicit changes in morals.
People called contraceptives immoral because these
would severe sex from procreation (and lead to
wanton sex); many are now quite happy to accept
that it did so indeed. Louise Brown, the first child
created by IVF, was greeted as a miracle or a monster,
depending on your view. Nowadays the excitement
seems distant, and IVF is accepted while recognizing
that it is invasive and a psychological burden.
Similarly, so the argument runs, people might now
feel uncomfortable about interfacing the body and the
brain with silicon-based implants, to enhance the
human; in another 10 years they will no longer
understand what the fuzz was all about.
The habituation argument can become part of an
action plan, e.g. of promotors of a new technology
who sit out the flak until people have become used to
the new technology. This is sometimes part of explicit
policies. A balanced example is the Dutch Embryo
Act, which prohibits the creation of embryos for
scientific research in section 24, but in section 33.2
explicitly states that this prohibition has to be
reassessed after 5 years to see whether prevailing
moral insights might have evolved by that time.
The second argument is the argument of moral
corruption. It comes in two forms: the slippery slope
argument stresses the temporal dimension of this
corruption; the colonisation argument the spatial
dimension. The argument can be deployed in its
own right, taking as its starting point that humans
have to be protected against their own bent towards
the immoral. As a strategy, it comes into play when
(parts of) public opinion seems to favour the
emerging technology and no convincing moral argu-
ments against the emerging technology itself have
turned up. In such a situation opponents can argue
that the new technology, although seemingly innocu-
ous or even beneficial now, will inevitably invoke
further technological steps that will later result in
applications that are blatantly immoral. The only way
to stop this from happening is to prohibit the
emerging technology from the start. For example: if
implanting a chip in the brains of paralyzed patients
will enable them to communicate with the world, who
in her right mind would want to deny that this is a
good thing? But that same technology, once devel-
oped, will be marketed for other less deserving
consumers and for less legitimate, manipulative or
hedonistic, purposes. The implanted chips, for exam-
ple, can and will then also be used for manipulative
mind-control or like a new kind of drugs.
In its spatial form, the moral corruption argument
leads to the same conclusion: better stop now before
the new technology can spread and be taken up for
the wrong goals. The new technology might indeed
address legitimate needs of a minority, but it is
impossible to stop others making less legitimate use
of the technology once this is developed. The
technology will spread out. Nuclear proliferation and
the attempts to contain it is a case in point. Nano
technology will develop ultra small bio-sensors that
will permanently monitor our body processes. This
can be important in hospitals. No longer confined to
the laboratory and the hospital, however, these
devices will result in the complete medicalisation of
our everyday lives.
The two types of moral corruption argument lead
to proposals for moratoriums and other ways of self-
and other-containment. The call for a voluntary
moratorium on recombinant DNA research in 1974
and 1975, by molecular biologists themselves, is a
well-known example [24]. Bans on cloning, because
of the risk that boys from Brazil will be cloned, are a
current example (there can also be deontological
arguments for such a ban, see next section). Such
proposals quickly turn into debates about practical-
ities, and the question of feasibility of containment.
Promotors of the new technology will use infeasibility
of global containment as an argument to allow them
to continue – because somebody elsewhere will
certainly do so, and we (perhaps with higher moral
standards) had better be in as well. Such debates
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overlap with what we call ‘consquentialist contestation’
and will discuss in the next section.
NEST-ethics: Patterns of Ethical Argumentation
In practice, NEST-ethics starts with a consequentialist
pattern of ethical argumentation: the new and emerg-
ing technology is deemed desirable, or not, because
its consequences are desirable, or not. Since such
consequences are still speculative, they have the form
of promises, or warnings and concerns when put
forward in an action-oriented context. NEST-ethical
discussion typically starts with the promises made by
scientists and technologists and those who identify
with their message about the new options. (See the
Philip Bond quote in the introduction.) These prom-
ises reflect the passion and confidence of those who
make them, but they are also a way to attract
attention, and thus financial, political and moral
support for the new ventures.
While promises can enrol allies, they can also raise
doubts and critical questions, already from actors
pushing other promises which compete for the same
scarce resources. Such discussions occur, for exam-
ple, around the promise of fuel cells and the hydrogen
economy [3]. The feasibility and desirability of a
hydrogen economy is questioned by those who push
other energy futures and other technologies to carry
them. For nanotechnology, such contestation remains
subdued because nanotechnology is relevant for all
sorts of applications, and thus unspecific in terms of
what it is competing with.
Critical reactions can also focus on the new
technology itself, independent of alternative techno-
logical options. In the consequentialist pattern of
moral argumentation, critics then have to identify
undesirable consequences to get a hearing. A struggle
ensues about the nature and plausibility of the various
consequences. Such consequentialist contestation is
further fuelled by a cultural expectation, in late-
modern societies, that there will be proponents as well
as opponents of a new technology [36], somewhat
independent of its specific features. In fact, by now
there are NGOs like Greenpeace with a professional
opponent role. When new technologies emerge, they
will try and identify the negative consequences. That
is their business model. Or sometimes, as in the case
of Greenpeace UK for nanotechnology, come up with
a balanced appraisal – which is then not believed by
proponents because they project the stereotypical
opponent role on Greenpeace.5
Other patterns of argumentation can be character-
ized as deontological, as focusing on justice, or as
drawing on ‘good life’ ethics, as we will show below.
In practice, they are most often additional to the
consequentialist pattern.
Consequentialist Arguments
Consequentialist contestation follows a distinctive
pattern, which is fuelled by two general perspectives
on technology, which are linked to the meta-ethical
discussion of agency. There is the optimistic view that
technological progress is basically beneficial, and a
pessimistic view of technology as inherently risky and
dangerous. The optimistic belief in technological
progress short-circuits the problem of uncertainty
and ignorance by arguing that there may be small
mishaps, but all in all, and in the long run, the new
technology will benefit us. As we discussed already,
this optimism gets extra ‘muscle’ by combining it
with determinism: you should not want to stop this
technological advance, but you cannot, either. Resis-
tance is bad as well as futile.
A priori pessimism about the effects of new
technology gets rid of the uncertainty and ignorance
just as well; you may not know exactly what will go
wrong, but go wrong it will. The critical stance that
goes with pessimism might lead to attempts at
changing the course of events, i.e. some voluntarism.
5Greenpeace UK [18] introduced a more ‘moderate’ NGO stand
in the nano risk debate: they argued that one should not just
focus on risks, but also on nanotech opportunities. They did
propose a moratorium on the release of engineered NPs in the
environment, but simultaneously recognised this moratorium to
be ‘impractical and probably damaging.’ They called on
industry to be responsible and to significantly increase funding
for environmental risk research. However, this complex
message was not received by the proponents of nano
technology. Rob Atkinson, director of the Progressive Policy
Institute, and Mark Modzelewski, executive director of the
Nano Business Alliance, accused the Greenpeace report of
being misleading propaganda and a form of ‘industrial
terrorism.’ This rejection rested more on Greenpeace’s reputa-
tion than on the actual contents of its report. (The quotes are
from Tim Harper’s TNT Weekly at the time.)
Nanoethics (2007) 1:3–20 11
But just as often we see pessimism and determinism
combining into fatalism. Resistance against fate is
then undertaken in a spirit of duty, not of hope. There
is more to say about the issues of uncertainty and
agency, as these are linked to basic views of nature
and society. For example, as Mary Douglas and others
have argued, a view of nature as resilient goes
together with a conviction that we can, and thus
should, go for technological progress, there is no
need to bother about side-effects until they appear.
The alternative view of nature as vulnerable is linked
to a view of technology as a “monster” that might
have to be banned, or at least contained from the
beginning [11].
Consequentialist contestation is inevitable in late-
modern societies. The pattern of moral argumentation
starts with promises which have the form: if we invest
in this new and emerging science and technology, this
will increase our knowledge as well as our scope in
manipulating the natural world, which will eventually
result in increasing general happiness when applica-
tion of such knowledge and manipulation leads to
positive effects x, y and z. Such a claim can and will
be challenged along three axes.
The first axis concerns the basis of the promises
made, that is, their plausibility. Because promises are
based on assumptions about, or projections on, the
future, one can demand that we get our “facts”
straight before taking these promises seriously. Some
optimists predict that nanotechnology will help to
interface human brains and computers, so that we can
‘learn’ French by simply implanting a chip. Highly
improbable, the objection goes, because learning a
language is extremely complex – as is shown by the
sometimes hilarious results of translation software
programs. Clearly, there are attempts to check how
speculative such predictions are, even if these will be
inconclusive because they are themselves part of the
consequentialist contestation. This is visible in the
prolonged debate between (the late) Richard Smalley
and Eric Drexler about the principle possibility of
molecular assembly. Smalley’s objections (“fat and
sticky fingers”) were not directly countered by
Drexler, who tended to refer to the occurrence of
molecular assembly in living cells to make his
position plausible. The pressure to assess the so-
called realism of the Drexlerian scenario is also
visible in the stipulation in the USA 21st century
nanotechnology Act of 2003 to do just that.
The second axis along which promises can be
contested, is not the plausibility of the benefits, but
the ratio of benefits and costs. Do the latter not
outweigh the former? Skeptics will stress the danger
of not acknowledging our cognitive limits. Trans-
gressing these limits, as the topos of the sorcerer’s
apprentice teaches us, means sowing seeds for future
disaster. This line of argument can lead to the demand
to first “get the facts straight,” e.g. by first assessing
health, environment and safety risks of nano-particles
before going into wholesale production and use.
Proponents of nanotechnology first contested this
demand (“there is no risk”), then grudgingly took it
up while production continued, and now recognize it
as a real concern. They fear a backlash if the public
finds out in a later stage that the risks were “under-
estimated.” Simply acknowledging risks, however,
might not be enough to prevent such a backlash.
Social studies have shown that experts generally
perceive risks in quantitative terms, whereas the
general public perceives risk in more qualitative or
narrative terms (cf. also [54]). As a result, there is a
real chance of miscommunication between these two
parties.
The third axis of consequentialist contestation
consists of questioning whether the benefits promised
are really benefits. This will shift the discussion to
another level, because this no longer is a factual
question but an explicitly normative one. Promises of
benefits imply views and criteria about what is
beneficial, even if these remain implied. Such views
and criteria can be unproblematic, when all partic-
ipants agree that health, absence of hunger, economic
growth, and cheaper products are desirable and that
hunger, sickness, and poverty are not. In the case of
cochlear implants, however, the promise of allowing
the deaf to hear again was contested by the deaf
community, with its own culture, and now officially
recognized language. The utilitarian criterion of
‘maximizing happiness’ has been shown by philoso-
phers to be inadequate. In the case of cochlear
implants for the deaf, the whole notion of happiness,
in the sense of what is considered to be beneficial, can
shift according to the culture from within one is
viewing happiness.
Underlying most consequentialist arguments is a
utilitarian ethics, with its moral drive to reduce pain
and to maximize happiness. In modern times, avoid-
ing or reducing pain (non-maleficence, primum non
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nocere) is taken to have priority over maximizing
happiness (beneficence). The underlying idea is that
suffering is not only more pressing than sub-optimal
happiness, but also a somehow more objective or
uncontested criterion than happiness [32]. Ideas about
what makes a person happy vary, whereas people tend
to agree about what counts as suffering. Few would
deny that hunger and sickness are harms that need
mending. Thus, one can understand why those
consequences of an emerging technology are fore-
grounded which reduce hunger and disease. The
facile way in which agricultural biotechnology was
(and continues to be) linked with reducing hunger in
developing countries is visible again for nanotechnol-
ogy.
Minimizing suffering and reducing harm are
phrased as positive goals. In practice they often also
function as it were negatively: as long as a new
technology does not harm anyone, it does not need
ethical discussion. This laissez-faire attitude can itself
be formulated as a political and ethical principle (cf.
[30]). It does raise questions about the burden of
evidence, which are taken up as patterns of moral
argumentation. Often, it requires critics to argue that
the new technology might cause harm to some
stakeholders and thus cannot be pursued freely. Those
favouring an emerging technology do not have (or do
not see) a duty to check for possible harms (except
when regulation requires them to do so, as with the
registration of new medical drugs). Furthermore, a
new technological option tends to be developed with
certain concrete stakeholders in mind, so at least some
of the benefits will be clearly defined. In contrast,
possible harms are often speculative, lie farther away
in the future and/or space, and concern as yet
anonymous, collective stakeholders. The asymmetry
of benefits and harms is almost unavoidable, struc-
tures not just argumentation but also action, and has
given rise to increasing recognition of the need for
early warning [20, 46].
There are three recurring rhetorical tropes in this
consequentialist cluster. The first is about upstream
solutions for downstream problems. This trope is very
visible in promises about genetic therapy, and in
human enhancement debates generally. No longer, so
the argument goes, will we have to muddle through
by fighting symptoms; genetic therapy and enhance-
ment technologies will finally enable us to go to the
(biological, molecular) root of the (medical and socio-
economic) problems and solve them there. In nano-
technology, upstream solutions are pushed when
nanotechnology enables enhancement technologies,
but also in relation to drug delivery and to problems
of developing countries.
Secondly, a sceptic might first allow that the
emerging technology will indeed plausibly deliver
some of its promises, but then proceed to deny that
this makes the emerging technology necessary. Here
the first trope about ‘upstream solutions’ gives way to
a second trope about the (un)desirability of ‘techno-
logical fixes’ and ‘social fixes.’6 There may well exist
alternatives that address the problems, say of envi-
ronment or poverty, as they appear here and now.
These alternatives are argued for by labelling the
proposed upstream solution a technological fix, with
its pejorative connotation of pushing through a
technological approach with all sorts of harmful side
effects. The assumption here is that social problems
deserve social solutions, not technical ones that only
address the symptoms anyway. Proponents can open
up this trope by arguing that the technological
solution is much more feasible and realistic than a
cumbersome social one. In that case it is narrow
minded and irresponsible – in the light of the pressing
problems – to cling to a dogma of social problems
deserving social solutions.
A third trope is precaution, i.e. precautionary
approaches in general and the specific precautionary
principle that is now part of EU regulations [14]. In
terms of Mary Douglas’s cultural theory, this trope of
precaution belongs with the hierarchists and bureau-
crats, not with collectivists/sectists whose precaution-
ary concern is to ban the monster of new technology.
Thus, in the formulation of the European Union, there
must be “reasonable grounds for concern for the
possibility of adverse effects” before there can be
measures “to ensure the chosen high level of
protection in the [European] Community” “based on
a broad cost-benefit analysis whereby priority will be
given to human health and the environment” [39].
Presently for nanotechnology, the focus is on risks
of nano-particles. There, precautionary approaches
have been narrowed to health and environmental risks,
and wider concerns about the need for nano-particle
6These are analyst’s terms, not necessarily actor’s terms. They
help us to identify the tropes in the debate.
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based products are backgrounded. We discussed this
example already at the end of “Technology, Morality
and Ethics: Preliminary Reflections.” What is inter-
esting here is how some actors, e.g. Greenpeace UK,
are concerned about the narrowing of the agenda,
question the benefits of nano-particles (cf. the fourth-
hurdle argument as discussed for biotechnology), and
start offering good-life ethical arguments. In other
words, consequentialist contestation has led to partial
resolutions, i.e. of the issue (here, health and
environmental risks of nano-particles) that was fore-
grounded in the debate, but there are residual
concerns which cannot be addressed in the conse-
quentialist pattern of argumentation. This creates
openings for deontological and good-life ethical
arguments, for the next step in the evolution of the
debate. Sometimes, as with stem cells, deontological
arguments are present at an early stage already.
Deontological Arguments
Deontological (i.e. right- and duty based) arguments
are expected to be up front when the new technology
touches upon deeply felt convictions and existential
interests. They can also function as a check on
consequentialism, because deontological principles,
in our societies, appear to have a right of way before
consequences. Even if the principles can be contested
by referring to benefits that we now forego, or risks
we have to suffer – an example of the latter would be
that individual choice and autonomy, as a principle in
medical ethics, has to be modified, for example
because of the possibility of community genetics.
Technologies may appear to produce desirable
over-all consequences, but they can still conflict with
deeply seated moral convictions about duties and
rights, often but not necessarily protecting the
interests of individuals or minorities that are threat-
ened by the majority interests favoured in consequen-
tialism (because of embedded utilitarianism). A good
example is medical experimentation on humans. Here
deontological principles protect individual patients –
or embryos – from being subjected to cruel experi-
ments that in fact could benefit public health.
In NEST-debates deontological arguments are
often introduced to counter optimistic promises. But
deontological principles are not only called upon to
frustrate emerging technologies. Common moral
principles supporting new technologies are: a duty
to further human progress, a duty to help diminish
suffering, a duty to acquire knowledge, and last but
certainly not least: the right to choose freely whether
or not to use a particular technology (as long as this
does not harm others, of course).
There are three main ways along which deontolog-
ical principles can be contested. First by invoking
another principle with a higher priority, e.g. by
stressing that the principle of nonmaleficence ( primum
non nocere) outweighs the principle of beneficence.
An example is the claim: “Although miniaturized
surveillance techniques might increase security, this
does not make the accompanying infringement of
privacy rights acceptable.”
A second way is by arguing that the principle does
not apply in the case of this specific technology. “Of
course it would be wrong to kill human beings, but
you cannot seriously consider a human embryo of less
than two weeks old, a human being.”
The third way to counter a concrete deontological
argument is by interpreting and applying the princi-
ples differently. The same principle is mobilized to
prohibit a new technology and to endorse it. For
example: “We all endorse the principle that people
should have a right to choose freely whether or not to
use a technology. But thinking through what will
happen in a competitive world full of inequalities, the
same principle entails that human enhancement
should be forbidden. When some individuals exercise
their right and start to technically enhance their
offspring, this in practice forces other parents to
follow suit. Allowing enhancement techniques to be
available therefore effectively infringes upon the right
of the other parents to choose freely not to use these
techniques.” This is recurrent argument, and there are
further moves, like emphasizing that the other parents
are still free to choose, only the effects of their choice
may hinder their offspring to compete with the kids
who were enhanced. We note that the structure of this
pattern of argumentation is the same as the argument
about new technology as an unstoppable train,
because “if we don’t do it, our competitors will”,
which we offered as part of a meta-ethical issue in the
beginning of “Nest Ethics: Meta-ethical Issues.” The
meta-ethical issue is visible in the reference to our
present competitive world, and to forces felt in
practice, which are both treated as given, and to be
accepted.
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Justice Arguments
Distributive justice, in the immediate sense of how the
benefits and the risks will be distributed, is an
important issue, even if it gets only passing reference
in NEST-discussions. The low prominence in these
discussions has to do with the mostly speculative
nature of the impacts. One can still project, and hope
that inequities will be mitigated, somehow. For
technologies closer to implementation than nanotech-
nology, for example biotechnology, distributive jus-
tice is higher on the agenda. Still, there are common
patterns in the moral argumentation.
There are contrasting views of what constitutes
distributive justice, depending on the distributive
criterion that is used: equality, need, merit, effort, or
a combination of these (as with Rawls [33] on
principles of justice). For NEST, the paradigmatic
issue in the discussions is a techno-divide, the gap
between rich and poor countries, and between poor
and rich strata of the population within a country. And
the basic tenet, accepted by most of the discussants
(even if the reasons are not clear), seems to be Rawls’
‘maximin’ rule: the new technology will only advance
justice when it will benefit those who are now worst
off: the poor (countries).
Arguments supporting developing the new tech-
nology in rich countries, and with affluent consumers
as the first target group, must then include a trickle-
down effect. The new technology will create more
goods/value, and therefore everyone can have a larger
piece – in absolute terms – of the expanded cake.
Although the new technology might at first benefit the
rich countries who had the resources to develop it, in
the end the poor (countries) might be the ones
profiting most: “what at first appears to be very
‘high-tech’ and costly and therefore perhaps irrelevant
for developing countries, in the end might come to be
of most value for those same developing countries.
Thus NT, were it to develop in the way it ought,
might ultimately be of most value for the poor and
sick in the developing world” [31].
There is a further move in this pattern of argumen-
tation. Even if the new technology does make the
majority better off in absolute terms, it might still
widen the (nano)divide between those reaping most
benefits and those left to pick up the crumbs. The
relative position of the latter group will worsen as a
result of the emerging technology: “The transition from
a pre-nano to a post-nano world could be very
traumatic and could exacerbate the problem of haves
vs. have-nots. Have-nots do not easily obtain access to
new technologies: the difference between the lives of
the nano-rich and the nano-poor will likely be striking”
[43, 204]. This latter argument need not, however, lead
to denunciating the new technology. The conclusion,
most often, is a plea for developing the technology in
directions that specifically address the needs of the
poor developing countries [29]. Thus, for some
proponents, the issue of distributive justice is more
than putting trust in the trickledown effect of new
technology.
Arguments from ‘Good Life’ Ethics
What sort of good life can be achieved thanks to new
and emerging science and technology? The promises
of enactors about new options tend to short-circuit
this question by projecting wonderful new possibili-
ties without reflecting on how ‘good’ this kind of ‘life’
actually might be. In contrast, commentators and
critical groups will sometimes outline a ‘good life’
and use this as a reference when discussing and
assessing new science and technology. This is partic-
ularly clear in the environmental movement (up to
‘deep ecology’). The ETC group, which now focuses
on critical evaluation of ongoing developments in
nanotechnology, is a good example because it had
started with a view on the good life, emphasizing
ecology (E), better use of technology (T) and reluc-
tance towards concentration (C), and this is still visible
in its arguments about nanotechnology in society.
One framing of a ‘good life’ occurs through
culturally shaped identities and aspirations: who are
we and who do we want to be? Indicative are references
to archetypical figures and myths. Those promoting
new technology typically draw upon a Promethean
identity, mixed with some frontiers rhetoric: “Boldly go
where no man went before.” Conversely, sceptics and
adversaries warn against Faustian bargains, and against
‘hubris’: proud Icarus soaring high in the skies like the
Gods – and then plummeting to his death.
Another framing of what is a ‘good life’ is visible
in discourses of limits. In the biotechnology debate, a
recurrent motif was that humans should not play God.
The concrete reference was to the possibility of
recreating nature. God’s Creation would then be a
shorthand, somewhat independent of theistic religious
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connotations, for respect towards what has evolved,
instead of it being objectified, instrumentalized,
commodified, subjected and manipulated.
Further limits are derived from what is deemed to be
natural. There exists a (hidden, but to be explicated)
moral order in nature that should be followed. If not we
will create monsters, as Victor Frankenstein did. Mary
Shelley’s novel is more complex, as it includes the
experience and feelings of the monster, and suggests
that monsters are the result of lack of care and love,
rather than because of the technology that went into
their creation. In the debate about genetically modified
food, especially in the UK, the term ‘Frankenstein
food’ or even ‘Frankenfood’ has become a shorthand
for what is inadmissible. “This is not what we want to
be on the shelves of our supermarkets.”
The focus on limits is often conservative: do not
transgress what is already there. Another way of
viewing what is out there, and what might put limits
on the aims of control that are associated with
technology, is the idea that human beings need
‘otherness’ and cannot flourish in a completely
controlled and manipulated, human built, “brave
new world” that plies itself obediently to our every
desire. This motif is visible when people start to extol
unspoilt nature, human imperfection, suffering, death
and fate. We want the world to put up resistance to
our touch, to show robustness, to surprise and
provoke us. We do not want the world to become a
mirror in which we only see our own image reflected.
The debate about the good life follows the lines
laid out by the short-cuts, rather than discussing the
good life as such. Proponents of a new technology
will offer more technology-friendly interpretations of
what God wants us to do, or even argue that God
means us to play Him (and others of course will
question His existence). The moral order implied in
nature is queried by arguing that it is our ability to
create technology what truly constitutes our human
nature. Others flatly deny that there is any moral order
hidden in nature (apart from the well-known natural-
istic fallacy). And while mankind has a bad track-
record as to wielding our technological powers
wisely, we are learning and making progress. And
finally, even when we will one day live in a complete
‘technotope,’ this will do nothing to diminish our
experience of ‘otherness’ because technology is every
inch as capricious, surprising and different as nature is
[41].
Two final comments. Good life arguments can lead
to clashes between incommensurable worldviews.
Instead, and to avoid such clashes, their persuasive
force is drained by treating the arguments as private
beliefs. For proponents, it suffices that the new
technology will help realize the wants and preferences
of at least some interested parties. They are not much
interested in shared conceptions of the good life, and
position conceptions of the good life as private. They
argue that although the belief in limits might be a
perfectly respectable private opinion, it does not
constitute a legitimate argument in a public discus-
sion. This (liberal) argument gives the ‘good life’ part
of NEST-ethics a peculiarly asymmetric and some-
what slippery character: arguments are not met by
counterarguments, but relocated from the public to the
private domain [45, 47].
Secondly, it is not always possible to draw a sharp
line between good life ethics and deontology. The
former envisages substantive, thick, conceptions of
the good, whereas the latter concentrates on ‘thin’
conceptions of the good or on what is ‘right.’ What
belongs to the ‘good’ and what belongs to the ‘right’
is always a matter of contention. To illustrate this: in a
society where most people believe in God and in a
moral order hidden in nature, the limits are all accepted
as belonging to the domain of the right, of what is
neutral. In a modern, secular, pluralist society the same
limits would have to be qualified as belonging to good
life ethics because they rest on non-neutral, and
therefore substantive, conceptions of the good.
Ethically Relevant Ambivalencies
of Nanotechnology, and an Arena
rather than an Agora Model
Clearly, a large part of the discussion of nano-ethics is
about NEST-ethics. But there might be ethical issues
somewhat specific to nanotechnology as well. We
think there are, and these can be brought out by
focusing on ambivalencies in nanotechnology.
Ambivalencies imply that there is no simple resolu-
tion: an attempt to go for one side of the ambivalence
brings out the problems linked with the other side.
Nanotechnology introduces new ambivalencies, and
enhances existing ones. Nano-ethics can then not be
an application of existing moral routines to a specific
sector or technology, here nanotechnology. It must
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venture into unknown territory: how to address
ambivalencies.
The slogan for nanotechnology, ‘size matters,’ is
ambivalent, as we noted already in the introduction.
At the nano-scale, the small size (of particles) creates
unexpected new properties, for example reactivity of
particles of noble metal gold. Unexpected new prop-
erties could just as well constitute hazards, however. If
“size matters,” nanotechnology will structurally intro-
duce risks. As Maynard et al. [28] put it: “Concerns
have been raised that the very properties of nano-
structured materials that make them so attractive could
potentially lead to unforeseen health or environmental
hazards.” They develop their argument in terms of
novel risks, reduced public confidence and fears of
litigation that may make nanotechnologies less attrac-
tive to investors and insurers, with specific reference to
earlier experience of asbestos health hazards and
financial risks to the insurance industry. Indeed, Swiss
Re’s earlier intervention in the debate is illustrative for
such concerns [48, 49].
Such arguments take an enactor’s position as their
starting point. The recipients of nanotechnology, com-
parative selectors as it were, might argue that they do
not need this new technology, with its inherent hazards.
And will thus be reluctant to buy into the promises.
The key point for nano-ethics is that no stable
consequentialist assessment is possible for nanotech-
nology as a whole. Every further venture on the nano-
scale can create new and unexpected benefits as well
as potential problems. For health, environmental and
safety regulation this implies that there cannot be a
generic regulatory approach. There will always be
novel types of effects that have to be taken into
account. So for regulation (with its inherent conse-
quentialist-ethics bias) a learning approach, with
emphasis on monitoring and self-reporting, becomes
important (cf. [8]). For nano-ethics more generally, a
learning approach as advocated in Dewey’s pragma-
tism will be important [9].
Another such ambivalence arises from the delega-
tion of agency to nano-enabled technology like smart
dust, and active systems in general. For example, in
theranostics (the combination of diagnostics and
therapeutics), a nano-enabled micro-system in the
body can make a diagnosis, and when finding, say,
the wrong level of concentration of X, do something
about it on its own accord. Or start attacking cells
diagnosed as cancerous. Such active systems are not
yet in place (except perhaps in some military
technology), but it is clear they will introduce
uncertainties about what will happen. Renn and Roco
[35] have discussed this in terms of risk governance,
arguing that traditional risk analysis cannot handle
this, and that scenario approaches should be devel-
oped. Further deliberation is necessary, where expert
scenarios are combined with what John Dewey called
‘dramatic rehearsals’ (see [6], 113–14).
Delegation of agency to technology is not new.
Bruno Latour has highlighted the de facto morality of
seat belts and signs to warn you when you haven’t put
them on, and speed ramps in roads are also called
“sleeping policemen” (Latour [25, 26]: 186–189).
This has been turned into proposals to create artifacts
which will do moral work (Verbeek [51, 52], who
elaborates the idea originally proposed by Achterhuis
[1]). All these examples, however, are of passive
systems. Active systems are now considered and put
in practice, for example advanced driver assistance
systems, which could make it impossible for a driver
to shift lanes if there was a car in the other lane. The
morality of active systems is of a different kind. In the
example of advanced driver assistance systems, it is
programmed into a device located in the car, and thus
traceable. However, the nano-enabled systems that are
envisaged, wander about in the world, helping us but
perhaps also creating havoc. You can’t have the one
without the other. This may well be a cause for
concern, and then lead to proposals for a moratorium
on such active systems. An example is Altmann and
Gubrud’s [2] argument for a moratorium on indepen-
dently active micro-nanosystems for battlefields. On
the other hand, a moratorium can be seen as
prohibiting learning about the new technology. We
will not enter into this particular discussion, but do
note that the whole notion of learning about new
technology becomes complicated when the techno-
logical device or system has, in a sense, its own
agency. While this is not specific for nanotechnology,
and thus does not qualify as nano-ethics per se, it is
definitely a cluster of ethical issues that is important
for technologies that converge at the nano-scale.
Another type of ambivalencies is linked to the
enabling character of nanotechnology so that eventual
effects are co-produced by the way it is embedded in
devices and systems and how these are taken up in
society. A cluster of ethical issues is involved here,
from foundational issues about distributed agency
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undermining traditional individual-based ethics, to
actor’s tactics in attributing praise and blame. Up to
gerrymandering, or “elasticity of moral thinking,” as
is brought out in Ravetz’s aphorism: “Science takes
credit for penicillin, while Society takes the blame for
the Bomb” (Ravetz [34]: 46).
The ambivalence resides in the claiming of positive
impacts for one’s action – here, developing a
nanotechnology -, but then also perhaps also being
held responsible for possible negative impacts. To
avoid being blamed, one can tone down one’s agency
(we couldn’t help it, we’re only a small part of a
bigger whole) – but then cannot be praised anymore
for what one has claimed to have brought about.
One further implication is that it will often not be
clear who is responsible for what (and thus might be
praised or blamed). Beck [4, 5] made such “organized
irresponsibility” a key part of his diagnosis of the
risk society. The organisation of irresponsibility is
visible in how enactors of nano-enabled technologies
position themselves.
Working towards biosensors for diagnostics, and
towards passive and active drug delivery systems, as
well as their combination (theranostics) is an impor-
tant activity in the nanoworld, and definitely so in its
repertoire of promises. When asking R&D people in
Philips Company (for which new diagnostic tools are
one of their strategic directions) about societal
impacts like changing responsibilities when point-of-
care diagnostics become widespread, they said that
was not their business. “Others should look into it” –
at some later time, but then the parameters of the
situation may have been fixed already by the shape
the technology has taken. For the Philips people, this
is a matter of pragmatic negligence, and the hope that
others will be diligent. At the societal level, it
amounts to organised irresponsibility. When this is
made explicit and debated, perhaps contended, there
will be a struggle about new roles and responsibilities,
and of distributing praise and blame (before the fact).
Organised irresponsibility is a general feature of
our late-modern risk society, and nanotechnology is
then one further site where this is played out. Because
of the promises made for nanotechnology, up to
undersecretaries of state (the Philip Bond quote)
claiming that the blind will see and the deaf will
hear – whether they want to or not, we add -, enactors
do not see any other responsibility than achieving the
promise.
This leads on to a general NEST-ethics issue, the
ethics of promising technology. In a nutshell: Thou
shalt not exaggerate without reason. But there is
reason: one has to mobilize resources to be able to
realize (materialize) the promises, and has to do so in
competition with many other claims on such resour-
ces. One has to claim more than is reasonable, in order
to be able to realize what is actually a reasonable claim.
This issue is widely recognized in the nano-world.
And it leads to an ambivalence in the sense that two
different actor-strategies are possible: Be willing to
inflate expectations, and hope disappointment will not
run high. Or be modest to avoid a backlash. The
former strategy is dominant in the USA, up to
recurrent reference to human enhancement. In
Europe, the sales rhetoric for nanotechnology is about
just making things smaller and faster.
What we have shown in this last part is that nano-
ethics does introduce some specific questions for
NEST-ethics, and makes existing questions/issues
more urgent. In particular, there are ambivalencies
which create challenges for actors as well as for
ethical analysts. As we noted already, the general
ethical point about ambivalencies is that there is no
simple resolution: an attempt to go for one side of the
ambivalence brings out the problems linked with the
other side. In other words, deliberative approaches
oriented towards consensus (the agora model) will not
work, and not because of communicative problems
between people with different positions and views
(that might be overcome by better interaction), but
because of the structure of the situation.
One might view NEST discussions as rational,
consensus-seeking deliberations. The idealized para-
digm for this type of deliberation is the classical
Athenian agora: the market place where the free
citizens gathered to decide, solely on the strength of
arguments, the good of their polis. Instead, one should
start with actor strategies, serving particular interests.
Not an agora where Rousseau’s volonté generale
takes form, but an arena where some win and others
lose. In an arena consensus is never reached, although
a workable compromise is sometimes achieved.
Consensus-seeking models can at best provide tem-
porary stabilisations.
It is not a fight of all against all, however. In the
public sphere in our societies, characterisized as
functioning democracies, all players are forced to seek
legitimacy for their standpoints. Such legitimacy can
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only be acquired by participating in deliberation. To
win in the arena, participants have to act as if they were
in an agora. In other words: even if the agora is an
illusion, it is a necessary one, and it is productive [44].
Since Machiavelli, political theorists have pointed
out that struggle among an irreducible plurality of
perspectives can be productive. Diversity, heteroge-
neity, incommensurability, and antagonism – they can
tear the fabric apart but they can also help to keep it
vital and vigorous. Probing each other’s worlds goes
together with competition for primacy in a universe
of discourse with others who cannot beforehand be
branded as unreasonable. Such reflexive awareness
rejects the naivety of dogmatic beliefs, recognizes its
own fallibility, and leaves room for reasonable dis-
sensus. Pragmatist ethicists can contribute by helping
develop different tools for ‘conflict’ and ‘dilemma’
management to enhance mutual respect [23].
In sum, there may not be a need of a dedicated
nano-ethics. Our discussion of essential ambivalen-
cies in nanotechnology has, however, thrown up
specific challenges to ethics which require us to think
through a number of basic issues, including the role
of struggle. Nano-ethics then becomes a site for
general ethical analysis.
As an instance of NEST-ethics, nano-ethics will
reproduce the general patterns to some extent, but also
modify them. An important point, which remained
implicit in our discussion of NEST-ethics, is the co-
evolution of ethics and new technologies: while there
are recurrent patterns of moral argumentation, there is
also learning, shifts in repertoires, new issues coming
up. The presently widespread acceptance of precau-
tionary approaches (definitely in Europe) is an
example of such a shift. What one now sees happen
with nanotechnology is a further kind of precaution:
promotors do not want impasses to occur as happened
with green biotechnology, and go out of their way to
communicate with publics and politicians [40], and
want to discuss ethics and societal aspects at an early
stage. While the debate still often follows the lines of
the patterns of moral argumentation we outlined, there
are now openings for further articulation.
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